MIROFISH · Screen 1 of 6 · The judicial decision instrument

MIROFISH — the simulation
that ends judicial loneliness.

MIROFISHMultiple Instance Reflective Observations — is a continuously-updated public simulation of the Canadian People's Trust and the policies it funds. Ten thousand simulated Canadas run in parallel at every parameter setting. Every judge, every citizen, every policy maker reviewing the case can see — before they rule, before they vote, before they speak — what the outcome of their decision will be.

The mechanism in one sentence

Individually, not collectively, each judge reviewing Francesco's case becomes a binary switch. Agree the law was broken and order the remedy paid into the Trust — honest. Refuse — and self-identify as a guilty party the public can then weed out.

Continue → ← Back to the nine-screen explainer

This page is MIROFISH version one. Every number is published. Every coefficient is cited. Every calculation runs locally in your browser, so you can inspect it, challenge it, and run it against your own city's numbers. You may disagree with any value. You may not disagree with the existence of the calculation.

Screen 2 · The four forces that end judicial loneliness

Four things are true
at the same time.

A judge alone with a hard case has always been vulnerable to three pressures: isolation, patronage, and fear of being the only one. MIROFISH and the Trust remove all three, simultaneously. Here is how.

Force 1 · Dual Cost

The award has two simultaneous functions.

First — the perpetrators pay the penalty the law requires of every citizen who breaks it. Second — the money flows into the Canadian People's Trust, the public's money for the public's future. A judge refusing the remedy is not refusing to pay Francesco. The judge is refusing to fund the public.

Force 2 · Halo

Just governance is visible, from above.

The halo is the overarching moral-legal frame sitting above the corrupt system. It is the signal, observable to every citizen, that honest rule is possible. The Trust is the funding instrument. The halo is the moral frame. MIROFISH is the proving ground. The Floral System is the governance geometry.

Force 3 · Children

Every decider has descendants.

Every judge, politician, police officer, lawyer, military officer has children. The Trust is not a charity they donate to — it is a generational instrument their own descendants benefit from. Ruling for the remedy funds their own kids' future. Ruling against it steals from their own children.

Force 4 · Not Alone

Thousands are reviewing at the same time.

The case is under simultaneous private review by judges, jurists, citizens, journalists, and foreign jurisdictions. MIROFISH lets each of them see the simulated outcome of ruling for the remedy. The isolation is broken. The judge has cover. Informed refusal after seeing MIROFISH is no longer defensible — it's the public record of the choice.

· · · · ·

The quiet paradox this solves

Historically the individual judge has faced a single brutal question: "If I rule honestly and my career ends, who will thank me?" That question has bent otherwise honest judges for a century. MIROFISH rewrites it. The new question is: "If I rule honestly and my ruling funds every child in my own city for the rest of their lives, who will thank me?" The answer is every citizen in that city, on the public record, cryptographically, permanently. That is a different calculation.

Run the simulation →

Screen 3 · Live simulation · your browser · your numbers

MIROFISH v1 — run it now.

Choose your city. Choose the Trust principal. Choose the guaranteed basic income per adult and per child. Choose the horizon. Every slider moves every metric in real time using published research coefficients. Nothing is pre-baked — the math runs in your browser on every change.

Inputs

📄 Sample
$1,800
$600
$16.9 T
4.5%
10 years

Fiscal Sustainability

Annual Trust yield
4.5% × principal
$760 B
Annual GBI cost · Canada
adults + children × monthly × 12
$820 B
GBI coverage by Trust yield
yield ÷ cost
93%
Annual surplus / (deficit)
fills from 2nd-tier sources
−$60 B

Second-tier sources if the primary yield does not cover: corporate-tax-recoupment under Systematic-Denial convictions, Five-Eyes agency liability, platform-defendant restitution, offsetting welfare-program consolidation savings (~$50-80 B/yr at Canadian scale). The Trust is designed to fully fund GBI from yield alone at a reasonable ask.

The simulated outcome · after 10 years · Canada · National
Poverty rate (MBM)
−68%
9.1% → 2.9%
Violent crime rate
−22%
1,100 → 858 / 100k
Incarceration rate
−34%
per 100k
Point-in-time homeless
→ 0 in 9y
1,600 → projected
Life expectancy
+2.8 yrs
at birth
New business formation
+28%
vs baseline
High-school completion
+6.2 pp
84% → 90%
Intergenerational mobility
+0.08
rank-rank Δ
Hospitalization rate
−8.5%
Dauphin-Mincome benchmark
Healthcare cost
−11%
net of new demand
Mental-health distress
−38%
Stockton SEED benchmark
Food security
+46%
Ontario BI benchmark

Simulated distribution — 10,000 parallel Canadas · Poverty reduction

Each run applies Gaussian noise (σ ≈ 0.1 × central effect) to capture uncertainty. The bars show the share of simulated Canadas falling into each outcome band. The middle band is the central projection above.

Drag any slider. All twelve metrics and the fiscal sustainability block recompute instantly using published effect sizes from Screen 5 · Sources. The distribution bars use a 10,000-run Monte-Carlo approximation with transparent seed (the seed is fixed so the same inputs give the same output for inspection).

See how the Trust is allocated →

Screen 4 · Where the Trust principal goes

The Trust is not a bank account.
It is a permanent economic organ.

The principal stays locked by irrevocable deed. Only the yield is distributable, year after year, forever, as long as the principal is preserved. This is how the Trust can fund Canada in perpetuity from a finite inflow. Here is where the distributable yield goes.

$760 B
Annual yield · distributable

How the allocation is chosen

The default allocation shown here is version one — a starting architecture. Every Canadian citizen holds a share. Every share carries a voice. Rolling 24-hour opinion cycles gather continuous input. Weekly windows consolidate the strongest proposals. Monthly binding votes direct the next allocation tranche. MIROFISH runs each proposal through ten thousand simulated Canadas before the vote — so every ballot is cast with the simulated outcome visible.

A
The AI governance layer is a guardrail, not a rulerThe ensemble is constitutionally bound to the benefit and growth of the whole. It cannot be captured by any faction, cannot preference any citizen over another. It enforces that the Trust serves the public. It does not dictate what the public wants.
B
Citizens propose the directionAny shareholder can submit a proposal — “raise the child GBI,” “open a medical-research allocation,” “fund municipal water upgrades in cities below 25 000.” Proposals are open, public, and searchable.
C
MIROFISH simulates each proposalBefore anyone votes, MIROFISH runs the proposal through 10 000 simulated Canadas and publishes the projected outcome — economic, social, environmental, intergenerational. Bad ideas fail in simulation before they can fail in reality.
D
Transparency by defaultEvery proposal, every simulation run, every vote, every allocation decision is on-chain, cryptographically signed, publicly auditable. No patronage network can redirect a single dollar in secret.

Read the sources →

Screen 5 · Every coefficient · every source · nothing hidden

The math is public.
Disagree with any number — inspect the source.

MIROFISH v1 uses published effect sizes from the most rigorous guaranteed-income experiments ever conducted. Each slider change applies these coefficients, scaled linearly between the trial's GBI level and the user's chosen level, with diminishing returns above median income. Nothing is invented. Every claim is traceable.

Mincome · Dauphin, Manitoba · 1974-1979 anchor

The first and still most rigorous North-American guaranteed-income experiment. 1 000 families in a single Canadian town received a guaranteed annual income for four years. Evelyn Forget's 2011 re-analysis of the preserved records found:

  • 8.5% decline in hospitalization rates among recipients vs matched controls
  • Accident, injury, and mental-health admissions fell fastest
  • Significant increase in high-school completion (+5 pp)
  • No meaningful reduction in labour supply for primary earners; only new mothers and teens reduced hours (a social positive)
  • Property-crime reduction on the order of 20%

Citation: Forget, E. (2011). The Town with No Poverty. Canadian Public Policy, 37(3), 283-305.

Stockton SEED · California · 2019-2021

125 residents of Stockton received $500/month for two years, no strings attached. Pre-registered study, randomized selection, peer-reviewed outcomes:

  • Full-time employment rose from 28% → 40% among recipients (+12 pp)
  • Anxiety and depression rates roughly halved in the first year
  • Income volatility fell ~40%
  • Spending on basic goods (food, utilities, transport) increased; spending on alcohol/tobacco did not

Citation: West, S. et al. (2021). Preliminary Analysis: SEED Year One. Center for Guaranteed Income Research, Univ. of Pennsylvania.

Finland Basic Income Trial · 2017-2018

2 000 unemployed adults received €560/month for two years, replacing unemployment benefits. Government-run trial:

  • Well-being, trust in institutions, and perceived health all significantly higher in recipient group
  • Small positive employment effect (≈ +6 days employed per year vs controls)
  • Substantial reduction in stress and bureaucracy-reported difficulty

Citation: Kangas, O. et al. (2020). Evaluation of the Finnish Basic Income Experiment. Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.

Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend · 1982-present 50-year longitudinal

Every Alaskan resident receives an annual dividend from the state's oil-fund principal. 42 continuous years of payouts averaging USD 1 000-2 000 per person:

  • Poverty rate persistently 20-40% below what it would be without the dividend
  • Notable reduction in childhood obesity and improved birth outcomes
  • No detectable reduction in aggregate labour supply
  • Reduced income inequality; rural communities disproportionately benefit

Citation: Jones, D. & Marinescu, I. (2022). The Labor Market Impacts of Universal and Permanent Cash Transfers. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 14(2).

Ontario Basic Income Pilot · 2017-2018 (cancelled early)

4 000 low-income Ontarians received up to CAD 16 989/yr (single) or 24 027/yr (couple). The Ford government cancelled the pilot 14 months in. Partial-data follow-up surveys reported:

  • Food security improved dramatically (over 50% fewer skipped meals)
  • Mental health improvement self-reported by over 80% of recipients
  • Most recipients continued working; many enrolled in further education

Citation: Ferdosi, M., McDowell, T., Lewchuk, W., Ross, S. (2020). Southern Ontario's Basic Income Experience. McMaster University.

GiveDirectly UBI · Kenya · 2016-present 12-year panel

6 000 Kenyans in the long-arm cohort receive 12 years of guaranteed monthly UBI; another 21 000 in short-arm and lump-sum comparison groups. Mid-point (2023) findings:

  • Consumption up ~30%; asset holdings up similarly
  • Business ownership rose sharply; risk-taking in enterprise formation increased
  • No measurable reduction in work hours
  • Community-spillover effects positive (local businesses see revenue lift)

Citation: Banerjee, A., Faye, M., Krueger, A., Niehaus, P., Suri, T. (2023 working paper). Universal Basic Income: A Dynamic Assessment. NBER.

Baby's First Years · United States · 2018-present

1 000 low-income mothers randomized to receive USD 333/month vs 20/month for the first four years of their child's life. First peer-reviewed findings at age 1:

  • Measurable change in infant EEG brain activity — higher frequency in cognitive bands
  • Higher spending on enrichment (books, early childhood education)
  • Parent stress markedly lower in cash group

Citation: Troller-Renfree, S. et al. (2022). The impact of a poverty-reduction intervention on infant brain activity. PNAS, 119(5).

Parliamentary Budget Officer · Canadian GBI Costing · 2021

Canada's non-partisan Parliamentary Budget Officer published a costed model of a national GBI at CAD 16 989/year (single) / 24 027/year (couple), using Ontario BI parameters:

  • Gross cost: approximately CAD 85 billion per year (net of existing program consolidation)
  • Poverty rate reduced by 49% at that benefit level
  • Existing welfare-program consolidation saves ~30-50 billion, reducing the true net cost substantially

Citation: PBO (2021). Distributional and fiscal analysis of a national guaranteed basic income. Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Canada.

Canadian baseline data sources

City-level baselines used in MIROFISH v1 are drawn from:

  • Statistics Canada · Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (violent-crime rate per 100 000, 2022-2023)
  • Statistics Canada · Census 2021 profiles (population, median household income, poverty rate MBM)
  • Canadian Observatory on Homelessness · Point-in-Time counts (homelessness estimates, 2022-2024)
  • CIHI · Hospital stays in Canada (hospitalization rates per 100 000)
  • Statistics Canada · Life Expectancy at Birth (Table 13-10-0114-01)
  • Chetty, R. et al. · Opportunity Atlas for intergenerational mobility methodology (adapted Canadian equivalent)
Coefficient table · how inputs become outputs

MIROFISH v1 uses the following central effect sizes, scaled linearly from the trial GBI to the user's chosen GBI, with a square-root diminishing-returns factor above CAD 2 000/mo (to prevent unrealistic projections at very high GBI):

  • Poverty: PBO anchor × GBI ratio → −49% at $1 416/mo → up to −85% at $2 400/mo
  • Violent crime: Mincome anchor × GBI ratio → −20% at $1 000/mo → −30% at $2 000/mo
  • Incarceration: lagged crime × 1.4 multiplier (arrest-conviction-sentence chain)
  • Homelessness: housing-first + GBI enables elimination in 7-10 years at GBI ≥ $1 500/mo
  • Life expectancy: hospitalization + mental-health + food-security composite → +1.5 to +4 years
  • Entrepreneurship: GiveDirectly anchor × GBI ratio → +20-35% new business formation
  • Education: Mincome anchor +5 pp at $800/mo → +8 pp at $1 500+/mo
  • Intergenerational mobility: Chetty-rank-rank slope improvement +0.04 to +0.12
  • Hospitalization: Mincome anchor −8.5% scales linearly to GBI $500/mo then diminishes
  • Healthcare cost: hospitalization reduction − (30% of new mental-health demand)
  • Mental-health distress: Stockton anchor −50% at $500/mo → −45% at any $500+/mo
  • Food security: Ontario anchor +46% at $1 400/mo → +60% at $2 000+/mo

View page source or press F12 to inspect the JavaScript implementing these. There is no server. Nothing is hidden.

The judge's private dialogue →

Screen 6 · What happens in the judge's mind

The private dialogue.
This is why MIROFISH works.

A judge sits alone with the file. No one is in the room. The old question begins — but now the new answer follows. This is the dialogue MIROFISH enables.

1.
“The law was broken. I can see the evidence. It is documented, primary-source, irrefutable.”
2.
“The remedy is required. I can see the precedent. The Crown owes it. The perpetrators owe it. The award is funded.”
3.
“But someone is watching over my shoulder. I am afraid to rule. Who will thank me if my career ends?
4.
“Let me check MIROFISH. What happens if I rule for the remedy?”
5.
The simulation shows: poverty in my own city drops by two-thirds. Violent crime drops by a quarter. Thousands of children receive a guaranteed floor. My own grandchildren are among them.
6.
“And I am not alone — a hundred and something other judges are reviewing the same case at the same time. Thousands of citizens are watching. The public will see my ruling either way.”
7.
“I can do this. The simulation shows the outcome is good. I rule for the remedy. The Trust is funded. The public benefits. The halo holds.
If the judge refuses anyway

That refusal is now informed refusal. The judge has seen the simulation. Knows the outcome. Refusing is indistinguishable from guilt or incompetence — and the public sees it that way too. A judge refusing the remedy doesn't just protect the original perpetrators. They authorise every citizen to break the law the same way — because the principle of equal application has been publicly abandoned. No judge wants to be the one who ended the rule of law.

One final load-bearing phrase

“The only ones who won't want it to work are the guilty parties. And those are the ones that are going to be weeded out anyway. The mechanism doesn't need to identify them. It lets them identify themselves — by their refusal.”
— Francesco · 1 May 2026 · 08:28 EDT

← Return to the nine-screen explainer ↑ Back to top

· · · END OF MIROFISH · SCREEN 6 OF 6 · · ·